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Using a data set of individual labor disputes brought to French courts over the years 1996 to 2003, the authors use variations in local conditions of the activity of the labor courts to assess the effect of dismissal costs on the labor market. First, the authors present a simple theoretical framework to explain the links between litigation costs, judicial outcomes, and firing costs. Second, they regress job flows on indicators of judicial outcomes, using an instrument, based on local shocks in the supply of lawyers. They find that when the numbers of lawyers increase, workers litigate more often, which should increase the firing costs for the firms. This increased filing rate causes a large decrease in employment fluctuations, especially for shrinking or exiting firms. The total effect on employment growth is slightly positive, and this result is more sensitive to the adopted specification.
Following the seminal article by Lazear (1990) , other researchers have extensively examined the effects of employment protection legislation (EPL) on labor markets through cross-country analyses, using indicators as sumed to capture the national strictness of EPL (see Freeman 2007 for a critical review). One strand of literature proposes more refined identifica tion strategies by assessing the impact of EPL within a single country. The variation of dismissal costs then usually stems from different laws across time and space or across employees and firms. This strategy typically involves measuring the impact of a change in legislation targeted to a specific *Hknri Fraisse is a Senior Economist at the Banque de France in Paris and a Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Francis Kramarz is Professor of Economics at the National category within a whole country or-in the case of the United States-t impact of the differential timing in the introduction of a new EPL acr different states. Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) and Autor, Kerr, an Kugler (2007) took advantage of the between-state variation in the timin the adoption of wrongful discharge laws in the United States. Kugler (19 exploited a temporal change in the legislation in Colombia, which redu severance payments as well as the variability in coverage between formal informal sector workers. Other studies used laws that entailed smaller fir costs for small firms (Bauer, Bender, and Bonin 2007; Kugler and Pica 20 Martins 2009 ). Still others relied on variations caused by legal probatio periods (Ichino and Riphahn 2005; Marinescu 2009 ).
In this article we propose another source of variation of dismissal cost Even when labor laws do not change, the functioning of the labor cour tends to vary over time and space. As pointed out by the OECD Employm Outlook (2004) , even if an employer may be penalized for not respectin EPL, "these provisions are subject to court interpretation and this may stitute a major (but often hidden) source of variation in EPL strictness b across countries and over time" (66) . Opening the black box of the labo courts seems a promising path. Judicial activity may sometimes matter mor than the content of the law (see, for example, Bhattacharya and Da 2002 , who found that insider trading laws decrease the cost of equity on when a case has been prosecuted).
For this study, we analyze the judicial process and its impact on the la market. Each year the French EPL system produces a large number of le procedures related to individual labor disputes (roughly 160,000 new ca every year, as we will see). About one in four dismissed workers indeed lenges his or her dismissal in front of a labor court.1 Workers win almost h of these cases, requiring the firms to pay damages. Besides direct costs, thes procedures can last for several months and involve uncertain issues, wh are indirect costs for firms and workers. It is these legal procedures that analyze in this article.
Yet using labor courts to assess the effect of dismissal costs on the lab market is not straightforward. The outcomes of the judicial processes at disposal-the filing rate, the fraction of cases leading to a settlement trial, and the fraction of trials won by the workers-give an indirect and par measure of dismissal costs faced by firms.2 In addition, problems of end neity abound: court outcomes are not exogenous to market conditio First, economic conditions have an effect on the quality of the cases brou to courts, leading to variations in the judicial outcomes. Second, marke conditions may influence the court decisions. Ichino, Polo, and Ret (2003) , using micro data on labor court cases, focused on this instituti 'By comparison, approximately 1,000 cases were filed in 1986 in the entire state of California, wh has a population and GDP close to those of France (these figures are taken from Dertouzos 1 endogeneity of EPL enforcement. Studying the case of an Italian bank over more than 20 years, they showed that a higher unemployment rate increases workers' probability of winning their cases. By contrast, Marinescu (2011) using data from a 1992 survey of Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain-found that a higher unemployment rate leads to more deci sions against the workers, in particular when they are already reemployed by the time of trial.
To cope with such endogeneity, we propose to analyze judicial activity, conditional on economic conditions. Litigation costs are key in this analysis. Firms should take into account litigation costs when they choose between a riskless but costly strategy to fire workers and a risky but potentially less costly option. Similarly, employees should make a cost-benefit analysis before choosing to litigate. We show with a stylized theoretical model how litigation costs drive both dismissal costs and the quality of the cases brought to court, thus judicial outcomes. This model shows that conditional on economic con ditions, judicial outcomes do not have a simple and univocal interpretation in terms of dismissal costs because they depend on judicial costs. For instance, an increase in the number of filed cases may be the result of larger dismissal costs for the firms if it is attributable to a decrease in the workers ' litigation costs. On the contrary, a larger number of filed cases may well come from smaller dismissal costs when the firms' litigation costs have decreased. The employers take more risks when firing workers, which leads to more trials, and thus they pay more on the extensive margin (more cases) but save on the intensive margins (less expensive cases). These composition effects apply not only to labor courts but also to divorce or more generally to any legisla tion that alters the decisions of workers, couples, and firms when they con tract, sue, or indeed go to court.3 Following the theoretical framework, we use litigation costs to instrument the indicators of judicial outcomes. More precisely, we use lawyer density as a proxy for legal fees.
On the empirical side, our contribution is threefold. First, we consider measures of judicial outcomes coming directly from legislation enforce ment with variation across space and time.4 In France, workers can contest the conditions of a firing by filing a case in one of the 264 local labor courts.
We use information collected by the French Ministry of Justice on all cases that were filed from 1996 to 2003 to compute, for each geographical juris diction and each year, various indicators characterizing the enforcement of the labor laws. These include the percentage of dismissed workers who liti gate in employment tribunals, the fraction of cases leading to a conciliation between parties, those that lead to a trial, and those that lead to a trial result ing in a worker's victory. We match these local indicators with a local mea sure of the legal environment, the density of lawyers, and with local measures of job flows a la Davis and Flaltiwanger (1992) . ' This has not escaped some analysts; see, for instance, Stevenson (2007) on legislation and divorce rates.
4Another kind of EPL enforcement is analyzed in Almeida and Carneiro (2009) : the activity labor inspectors in Brazil.
Second, since onr research is in France, a country in which many inst tions are centralized and do not vary across the French territory (such as m imum wage, unemployment benefits, and wage bargaining), we are abl control for most of the French labor market institutions (see, however, min and Wasmer 2009 on the noticeable exception of the working time r tion laws in one French region, Alsace-Moselle, and the one presented in article as a robustness check). Third, we use an instrumental variable strateg to correct for the endogeneity from which estimation of the relation betwe economic conditions, including job flows, and application of the labor la might suffer. The instrument relies on the location of universities train French lawyers, irrespective of their legal specialization, and the large incre in the number of lawyers during our period. We show that lawyer localizati is disconnected from local business conditions. Then, after having sho through our stylized model the links between judicial outcomes and fir costs, we measure the effect of judicial indicators on job flows at the intens as well as the extensive margins. Several articles assessing EPL also used flows (see, for instance, Autor et al. 2007 and Kugler and Pica 2008) . Unf nately, because we lack worker-flows data for the very small firms in whic large fraction of our labor court cases take place, we cannot combine the joi analysis of job and worker flows as was done in Kugler and Pica (2008) .
As in all the empirical studies we are aware of, this one focuses on t impact of labor regulations on labor market characteristics and leaves a the welfare gains from job stability that must be taken into account for po recommendations.5 However, and in contrast with the existing empiric erature, our labor court outcomes capture some dimensions of the qualit labor relations that, according to Philippon (2004) and Cahuc (2009) , are related to the evolution of labor market conditions. Labor Courts in France: The Institutional Setting
French Firing Laws
Under current French law, a worker may be dismissed for either personal or economic reasons. Dismissals for economic reasons are redundancies because of a slowdown in business activity and are supposed to be dent of the quality of the employee. Personal dismissals are trigger worker's grave misconduct or an insufficient level of skill. In Fran many European countries, an economic dismissal entails a more cated and time-consuming process. This process is restrictive si employees who can be fired first are defined by collective agreemen ing to their age, qualifications, and so forth. The process is also cost It is important to note that economic dismissals are rarely challenged in front of a court. In our data, indeed, 97.5% of the cases filed in the Prud'hommes come from personal rather than economic dismissals.6
When fired, a French worker may sue the firm.7 Since the passage of legis lation in 1973, every individual dismissal must be justified by a "real and seri ous cause," and the firm has the burden of proof on this issue. Although 30 years of jurisprudence have made this concept simultaneously blurred and precise, in general "real" means that the wrongdoing justifying the dismissal must be objectively defined, accurate, and in line with the mandatory firing notification letter. For example, being 10 minutes late does not mean being 70 minutes late; a lack of performance or a lack of trust is not considered real if it is not objectively measured. The cause is considered "serious" only if it is related to the professional activity of the worker and if it makes the labor relation impossible to continue. There are various degrees of seriousness. Some lead to "grave misconduct" (for example, a brawl or thievery), which allows the employer to fully deprive the worker of severance payment (in this case, the employees may also lose their unemployment benefits).
Over the 1996-2003 period under study and when the individual dis missal is deemed fair, firms have to pay severance of 1/10 of monthly salary per year of service. If the employee has worked more than 10 years in the firm, the severance amounts to 1/10 + 1/15 of monthly salary per year of service. Ifjudges rule the dismissal unfair, the compensatory award depends on their estimates of the magnitude of the damages incurred by the worker.
In this case, however, the compensatory award must be at least six months' pay if the employee has worked more than two years in the firm. Unfortu nately, in France there are no data about these awards. Serverin (2002) , rely ing on a survey of 7,962 cases collected in 1996, estimated that the average award asked by the worker equaled the annual (gross) minimum wage.
French Labor Courts
French labor justice is dispensed mainly by the "Prud'hommes," which a the relevant jurisdictions for every labor dispute arising at the individu level in France. During our period of analysis, 1996 to 2003, 264 Prud'hommes jurisdictions were spread all over metropolitan France, a tri bunal being at most 30 miles from any establishment.
The judges in the Prud'hommes are not professional judges and are seen by some as performing a public duty. Each labor court comprises judges representing employers and those representing employees in equal num ber. They are elected every five years within lists established by worker fiWhen, for economic reasons, a firm with more than 50 employees needs to dismiss more than 10 employees within 30 days, the procedure becomes a "collective dismissal" and has to follow complex rules. In case of collective litigation, the case is treated by courts other than those treating personal dis missals. Nevertheless, the number of cases is small in those courts as well.
'The worker has to leave the firm when fired, even if he or she sues the employer. In the end, the court may reinstate the worker within the former employing firm, but it is extremely rare. unions and employer federations. On the employee side, the electoral bo includes all private-sector workers with a labor contract.
Prud'hommes are supposedly not very formal and should be seen as c ciliation boards. They were designed to foster agreements rather than tr Therefore, a first and mandatory step in each trial is a conciliation audie in which plaintiffs and defendants explain their grievance and judges try push for an agreement.8 If they are not successful, the case is judged. If the end, an equal number of judges decide in favor of and against a work there is a tie (solution de departage). In this case, a single professional ju decides the outcome of the trial.9
The plaintiff or the defendant can appeal the decision of the court if the stake is larger than a given threshold (about 5,000 euros in 2006). It is worth noting that 60% of the decisions were appealed in 2004. Among them, 55% of these appeals did not overrule the Prud'hommes' decision, and 30% con firmed it "partially."10
There are unfortunately no data on litigation costs. The Prud'hommes institution is seen as a public good, and thus filing a case is cheap. The costs are mainly those incurred by the representation. Workers can obtain legal help through other means than hiring a lawyer: a union member, a coworker, or an administrative officer can help the worker with his or her case. It is worth noting, however, that, according to our data, almost half of the work ers who sue are represented by a lawyer. This contrasts with the situation in other countries for which this information is available (for instance, 18% of worker-plaintiffs in the United Kingdom have lawyers; see Fraisse 2010).
Judicial Activity and Firing Costs: A Simple Theoretical Framework
We develop a simple analytical framework to help us understand the rela tionships between the various legal steps within labor courts and firing costs, taking specifically into account the conciliation step in this judicial process. Our intention is not to break new theoretical ground but rather to focus ideas. In particular, this model will help us illustrate and understand our empirical strategy and results, as the links between firing costs and the out comes of this judicial activity are ambiguous.11 8It is worth noting that in this respect, the French setting is close to that of almost every OECD coun try, where courts usually attempt to reach a compromise solution at the start of formal legal proceedings (see Venn 2009 ). 9Moreover, in case of an emergency, a summary judgment can be made. Such judgments are only tem porary and might be overruled afterwards. In this article, we do not consider these summary judgments.
l0Munoz-Perez and Serverin (2006) . Unfortunately, current available data sets do not allow us to track the cases across the levels of jurisdictions; whether the decision is appealed by the worker or the firm is unknown.
"We do not study here the theoretical impact of firing costs on labor market variables. This has been extensively examined elsewhere. To sum up, standard models show that larger firing costs entail slower and smaller adjustments, with an ambiguous effect on employment (see, for instance, Bentolila and Bertola 1990) , except if the firing cost can be endogenized by the firm during the wage bargaining (see, for instance, Garibaldi and Violante 2005. In their model, firing costs due to EPL are the sum of two terms-a transfer from the firm to the worker, which can be endogenized by the firm, and a tax paid outside the firm-worker pair resulting from the cost of the trial, which is a cost on labor that cannot be undone by side negotiations).
To illustrate how firing costs are related to judicial outcomes, we depart from the traditional model of litigation proposed by Priest and Klein (1984) , Bebchuk (1984) , and Card and McCall (2009) to run a cost-benefit analysis similar to the one proposed by Flanagan (1989) for disputes related to com pliance with the National Labor Relations Act in the United States. For sim plicity, the setting that we describe below has no uncertainty, no asymmetric information that would explain why trials take place; everything is known and predictable. We will return to this topic later and discuss how our results are affected by asymmetric information.
In our analysis, the employer can deliberately choose to pay a minimal firing cost and risk being sued by the worker or decide to pay a larger amount, which corresponds to the payment a plaintiff would accept in order to give up any further possibility of a lawsuit. Important to note here is that this last sum is not negotiated between the firm and the worker but comes directly from legal precedents (jurisprudence). In France, it should amount to one to two years of earnings (Kramarz and Michaud 2010) . Another way of understanding the model is as follows: a firm chooses to dismiss the worker either for personal reasons, paying a small severance payment, or for an economic reason (redundancy) with larger severance payments.12 Our hypothesis, then, is that when firms pay the severance payment correspond ing to a redundancy, the workers never choose to sue the firm. When the worker goes to court after a dismissal, the firm has to prove that the case is a legitimate dismissal for personal reasons rather than a redundancy.
In the case of a dismissal for personal reasons, the firm incurs a minimum severance payment (cm) if the dismissal remains unchallenged by the worker.
This payment is lower than the maximum severance payment cM, which leads the worker not to sue the firm. Yet the firm has to take into account the facts that the worker can file a suit (pj = 1 if he does, pj = 0 otherwise) and that he can then end the case with a formal agreement in front of the judge (pc= 1 if he does, pr=0 otherwise). The firm also recognizes the prob ability that the worker wins if the trial occurs, pw. We assume that during the conciliation step, the judge tries to reach an agreement using an "interme diary" severance payment c0 given by the case law, always lower than cM. Note that in order to simply introduce the coexistence of a conciliation stage and a trial stage we consider c( to be constant. The firm cannot increase cc in order to avoid trial.
The uncertainty of the entire process is summarized through pw. The firm and the employee share this value. In this cost-benefit analysis, we assume that the quality of each case is known by both parties and is related to observed characteristics of the workers and of the firms. For instance, union or personnel delegates or pregnant women are very well protected by the law, and the judges tend to rule against dismissals of such individuals. Sev eral past statements in judgments also show that judges demand more 12For an empirical illustration of a trade-off between two litigation processes, see Oyer and Schaefer (2000) . stringent evidence when a firm has had large positive profits in the year preceding the trial.13
At this point we have introduced no uncertainty, no asymmetric inform tion that explains why trials take place. Theoretically, firms and worke should agree on a payment in order to avoid the litigation costs. Two fe tures could be added to the model in order to explain why firms and wor ers go to the Prud'hommes and then, if ever, to trial. First, costs for reachin an agreement with the help of a private arbitrator could be larger than th costs at the conciliation stage of the legal procedure. This seems plausib since the Prud'hommes institution is seen as a public good and the conci ation stage is cheap. Second, in line with the literature in which trial is a equilibrium outcome, we can assume that the worker and the firm have d ferent and irreconcilable expectations on the outcome of the trial. T assumption would lead to a "contract zone" in which a settlement amoun can be found (see Bebchuk 1984) . When the expectations are not in t contract zone, the trial takes place; otherwise an agreement can be found the conciliation stage. Because there is a need to model expectations, com putations become much less tractable. Our framework would lose its sim plicity without gaining much insight for our purpose. In addition, underlined by Spier (2007) , such a model does not fully solve the litigatio puzzle since the conciliation stage should help narrow expectations. From this discussion, it is, however, interesting to note that workers employed large firms go much less often to Prud'hommes. In line with the above d cussion, the various probabilities should be better known by the human resources management and union delegates who are always present i larger firms. Hence, these firms should escape trials and easily agree on separation payments. In small firms, conflicts often become personal an difficult to solve without the help of a neutral third party, a role apparently played by the Prud'hommes.
Analytical Framework
Now let us go back to our analytical framework. The parameters jty and p telling whether the case is filed and whether it ends at the conciliation stage, result from the optimization from the firm and the worker and are equal either one or zero. The key parameters in our analysis will be the litigat costs. We note F, the compensatory award for the worker when he or s wins the case; lc, the firm's litigation cost when the parties reach an agr ment at the conciliation stage; lt, the firm's litigation cost when the part go to trial; and symmetrically kc and kt, the worker's litigation costs at t conciliation stage and the trial stage.
The employer dismisses the worker at the minimum cost instead of pa ing the maximum severance payments if the expected firing cost is small '^Unfortunately, the data do not contain a firm identifier. Hence, it is not possible to directly rela firm and worker behavior.
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As for the worker, he or she chooses to challenge his or her dismissal (p, = 1) if his or her expected gain at trial or at the conciliation stage is larger than the minimum severance payment:
Under various technical assumptions (presented in the model in the Appen dix), four potential regimes define judicial outcomes, depending on the value of pw and three thresholds ~n~ IT r* ■ ~tT -~n~ -C'' _Cm + ~ and n* -°M~ C'n ~ ^ Pw Pw Pw ■ Pw -" ' Pw -~ ■ ana Pw -r For larger probabilities (pw < pK < pw), conciliation takes place. Since the expected gain of the worker at trial is positive, he or she can credibly threaten the firm to go to a full hearing. The firm agrees to settle with the worker because the settlement amount is lower than the expected loss of the firm at trial (and larger tjian the expected gain of the worker). For even larger probabilities (pK < pw < pi*), the worker is better off at the trial stage and refuses to conciliate anymore. The firing cost gradually increases when the probability of winning increases.
And finally, for the largest probabilities (Pw > Pw), the firm pays cM up front to avoid the costs of going to court.
These regimes are presented in Figure 1 , where the firing costs are graphed as a function of the probability of winning the case. Proofs are given in the Appendix. The technical assumptions are four inequalities between the different costs, which allow the four regimes to exist. For instance, the cost of trial for the firms must be large enough that the con ciliation is less costly in some cases. Note that in our data the four regimes exist in all jurisdictions.
We can now illustrate the effects of changes in the litigation costs. Let us assume that economic conditions are given. We assume that the distribution of the case quality is invariant, meaning that the distribution of pw of the dismissed persons is given. The total firing cost for the firm is given by: where L is the number of fired workers, G is the cumulative distri function of the case quality of these fired workers, and Cl(.) is the = Pw(cm + F) + {\-pw)cm +1,. This firing cost is the area under ken line in Figure 1 , weighted by the distribution function of the cas Suppose now that the litigation cost for the firm lt increases. Figu trates the results: pw is the only threshold that changes (it decrease firm's expected cost at trial rises; thus the firm has a greater incentiv high-probability workers with an economic motive to avoid lawsuits. firing cost increases as the area under the full line is bigger than under the dashed line. This cost is larger even if the number of trials Result 2 If the litigation cost for the firm lt increases, the total firing cost increases, assuming that the distribution of the case quality is given. The numbers of filed cases and trials decrease, as does the quality of the filed cases.
Let us study the following case: an increase in the litigation cost for the worker kt (see Figure 3 ). This increase results in a decreased probability for the workers to file a case (through a higherpw ) and to go to the trial (through a higher pw ). This model shows that changes in the litigation costs have intuitive impacts on the firing costs: firing costs increase with firms' litigation costs and decrease with workers' litigation costs. In addition, changes in the liti gation costs have an effect on judicial outcomes, which is an important fac tor that justifies our instrumental strategy. Yet the link between firing cost and judicial outcomes is ambiguous; the model will be useful in interpre the results of our instrumental strategy since we aim at assessing the effec firing costs on the labor market.
Data and Methodology
Judicial Cases Data Our data source on individual cases comes from administrative records made in each geographical jurisdiction and collected by the statist department of the French Ministry of Justice. The primary goal of t data is to monitor the activity of labor courts with an emphasis on spee treatment. The data source is exhaustive for the period 1996 to 200 includes approximately 1.3 million individual cases for eight years (ar 160,000 cases each year).14 For each case, the starting date, the ending date, the motives for missal, and the court decision are recorded. An average case takes app mately one year (343 days) with a standard deviation of nine months.15 each case, we know the legal representation chosen by the firm and t plaintiff. Few characteristics of the employee-plaintiff are available: m gender and age. As for firms' characteristics, we know the industry and size (more or fewer than 10 workers). Labor court judges have to know size of the firm because labor laws differ for small firms; more specifi the laws are less stringent and are intended to ease the costs of firing could hurt small firms. Small firms are overrepresented with 56% of filed cases, whereas they comprise 25% of the labor force.16
The motives for suing are multiple. In the majority of cases (58%) p tiffs ask for nullification of a dismissal. Twenty-one percent ask for s compensation that was not paid by their former employer, whereas 9 plaintiffs do not agree with the amount of their severance payment. whatever the motive is, the judgments of the trials won by the worker very similar: a compensatory award paid to the plaintiffs. Even when t ask for nullification of a dismissal, in the vast majority of cases won b workers, they are not reinstated but receive a compensatory award. Th this article we do not distinguish between these different motives.
For any given case filed in a labor court, the range of outcomes is wid case can lead to a full tribunal hearing and be lost or won. It can be c fied as null and void if the plaintiff has not shown due diligence in the duct of the case. The case can also be crossed out. Finally, a case ca 14We will not consider the 2% of cases involving employers as plaintiffs.
'"'Because we use jurisdiction-level information for our analysis rather than case-level information tables will report jurisdiction-year statistics. All case-level statistics are available from the auth request.
"'The variable size of the firm exhibits a lot of missing values at the beginning of our period. Excluding
2003, which appears to be an outlier, the quality of the variable increases gradually (42% of missing value in 1996 to 14% in 2002). At the same time, the share of small firms increases (42% in 1996 to 90% in 2002) . The average in our period, 56%, might be a lower bound. Because of these changes in the quality of the variable, we did not try to analyze the effects of judicial activity for small and large firms separately. Because cases can also be dropped, the sum of the trial r conciliated either during the conciliation formal agreement sent to the court.
These data on individual cases are use measures of the cases examined in each j cator relates to litigiousness: the filing r ber of dismissed persons.17 The three o outcomes of the cases: the worker and they go to trial, and in that case, eithe build three indicators: the conciliation rate, the number of cases conciliated or leading to an agreement over the number of cases; the trial rate, the number of cases reaching trial over the number of cases;18 and the worker winning rate, the number of cases leading to a victory for the worker over the number of cases.
During our period, 1996 to 2003, no changes were made to the labor laws. The number of cases treated by labor courts appears to be stable ove the period, in stark contrast with what happened in some countries such the United Kingdom, where a sharp increase took place (Burgess, Popper, and Wilson 2001) . It is important to note that the percentage of filed case among the dismissed persons is large (mean of 22%; see Table 1 ). Almost one dismissal in four ends in the labor court.
l7No exhaustive statistics give the number of dismissed persons in France; we are thus obliged to have a proxy through the number of registered unemployed who declare being unemployed because of a dismissal. These figures come from a data set compiling the stock of unemployed registered at the national employment service at the end of the year (National Agency for Employment ANPE at this time)
in each city, distinguishing the reasons for being unemployed (dismissal, entry into the labor force, end of temporary contract, etc.). As for job flows (see below), we aggregate these data at the jurisdiction level.
l8Because cases can also be dropped, the sum of the conciliation and of the trial rates is smaller than Despite the conciliation step, which is mandatory and promotes a qui and costless resolution of the cases, about 60% of cases end with a trial, among which 75% lead to a worker's victory. Of all filed cases, only 20% at the conciliation stage or lead to an agreement notified to the court o a withdrawal on the worker's side. Nineteen percent of the cases are cros out or classified as null and void if the plaintiff has not shown due dilige in the conduct of his or her case.
All indicators of judicial activity display a very strong variance over time and across jurisdictions. Our model can help us understand two main sources of variability: business cycle and litigation costs. We will discuss below the links between the business cycle and judicial activity, which are a source of endogeneity. Then we will explain that institutional variability in the number of lawyers entails different litigation costs at the jurisdiction level. This will give us our instrument.
Job Flows Data
We want to assess the impact of our judicial indicators on the functioning of the local labor markets. Besides examining local employment, we build job flows variables to assess whether the effect of judicial activity is different on expanding and shrinking units. Local employment flows at the establish ment level are computed from the French register of firms, SIRENE files, maintained at the French statistical institute (INSEE).19 These files give the precise location (city) for each establishment. We compute a set of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) Conversely, job destructions equal employment losses summed over al shrinking or exiting business units.
These measures are aggregated at the jurisdiction level, using a 1999 cor respondence between cities and jurisdictions provided by the Ministry of Justice. The rates of job creations and job destructions from year t to year t+1 are computed relative to average employment in the two years. Thus the job creation rate is defined for the jurisdiction^' and year t as:
where E/t is the set of establishments in the jurisdiction j at time t, xet is th number of jobs in the establishment e, and XJt is the total number of jobs at the jurisdiction level. In comparison with cross-country analyses, these indicators also show a high heterogeneity across periods and across the 264 geographical jurisdic tions. The job creation rate and the job destruction rate hover around an average of 16%, with the mean of net employment growth rate being zero (see Table 1 ).
To measure local unemployment, we use the number of unemployed as registered at the public employment office (ANPE) for each city as well as the city labor force as measured at the 1999 Census. Unfortunately, there is no data set giving us the size of the temporary help service industry at the local level of the city Hence, we cannot perform an analysis as done in Autor (2003) . In contrast with other European countries (such as Spain), however, the fraction of temporary workers in French total private employ ment is low (about 2.5% in 2009).
Finally, we cannot analyze worker flows since such measures are not avail able for establishments with fewer than 10 workers and establishments in this category are the ones most commonly sued. In addition, because France has a dual labor market with both short-term and long-term contracts (see Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz 1999) , it is essential to also measure the con Thus an increase in firing costs of permanent contracts would imply flows from permanent workers but higher flows of those with tem contracts, leading to an ambiguous effect in total worker flows.
Instrumental Variables: Discussion and First Stage
We want to assess the causal effect of our indicators describing lab putes on job flows. Yet the judicial activity is likely to be endogenou model can be used to discuss the endogeneity problems that we will when estimating the relations between judicial outcomes and labor m characteristics. For instance, bad economic conditions probably chan distribution of the case quality among the dismissed persons. The d tion G of the model is then likely to change. If the proportion of pe having a good case increases, the filing rate would increase (except cases are too good, which would induce firms to pay enough to avoid An adverse shock on the labor market conditions can also affect lit costs through the level of compensatory award. According to the legi F compensates the worker for past and future potential wage losses, ticular by taking into account the difficulty of finding a new and compa job. The magnitude of F is the_refore likely to be countercyclical.23 nomic downturn pushes pw , pw , and Pw downward, which results, things being equal, in higher firing costs. Moreover, economic cond might also alter the overall distribution of pw through judges' beh Judges showing a pro-worker bias when labor market conditions dete increase the firing costs faced by the firms (see Ichino et al. 2003 ). Thus we need instruments that explain the judicial outcomes obser the level of the jurisdiction and are exogenous to current labor marke opments. According to the model, a good instrument would be a so variation of litigation costs exogenous to local economic conditions. Our instrument is the number of lawyers enrolled at the local bar in e year-lawyers of all specialties, not only those specializing in labor d a small fraction of the total-scaled by total employment of the juris ("lawyer density"). In France, each lawyer has to be licensed and regi at the local bar (barreau) in order to be entitled to practice. We kno number of lawyers registered at each such barreau from 1996 to 20 allows us to have a local estimate of the number of lawyers (divided b employment in the jurisdiction). As there are fewer bars in France Prud'hommes jurisdictions (181 versus 264), we match each jurisdict the closest bar using shortest-route distance and compute the num lawyers available to employees who depend on a given jurisdiction. the 1999 Census, we find that the jurisdiction average is 24 lawyer ^Regressions of our indicators of judicial activity on local unemployment rates show that strongly correlated with the cycle (see Table A .l). The cyclical behavior of collective conflicts extensively studied in the literature (see Harrison and Stewart 1994 10,000 persons in the labor force, going from a minimum of 2 to a maxi mum of 464 (see Table 1 ).
An increase in lawyer density is likely to reduce legal fees thanks to greater competition (see Siegelman and Donohue 1995 for a similar argument). It is important to note that the level of legal fees in France is unregulated; the law frames the types of prices (which, for instance, cannot be entirely deter mined by the judicial outcome) but not the level of prices. Increased lawyer density also helps to disseminate legal expertise and judicial knowledge of labor disputes among the population of workers. It should correspond to a lower cost of litigation for the worker (k, and kr in our model) and hence influence judicial activity and case outcomes. Our model produces this result even without assuming that being represented by a lawyer increases the probability of winning. Given data availability, it is empirically hard to test such a relationship in the French case. There are no data on legal fees, yet it is possible to verify that lawyer density is negatively correlated to lawyer income. Exploiting a 2008 report published by the French National Bar, we are able to regress at the regional level-there are 21 regions in France-lawyer income on law yer density controlling for mean wages (to correct for regional differences in the cost of living and income). In this regression estimated for the year 2006, the coefficient of the density variable is negative and strongly signifi cant.24 Thus changes in lawyer density within a jurisdiction should influence judicial outcomes through the cost of the litigation process.
One could argue that the lawyer's choice of location depends on local economic conditions. First, labor disputes comprise only a small part of the total number of civil cases (11% at the national level);25 thus it is unlikely that the labor market of the lawyers is affected by the activity of the Prud'hommes. Second, in order to get a license to practice, a lawyer must enroll in a local bar. This requirement and the building of a reputation and a clientele lead to a low mobility of lawyers from one region to another.
We think there are two main factors explaining the lawyers' location pref erences, which are unrelated to the incidence of labor disputes litigation: the location of their law schools and the region where they were born (these are often the same). First, a lawyer typically enrolls in the bar in the city where he or she studied: legal studies are vocational and include a period of apprentice ship, usually in a nearby law firm. 26 A second factor explaining the location preferences is the region of birth. This is not specific to lawyers,27 but lawyers can settle close to their region of '-'Results are available from the authors. 26It is worth noting that in France, very few lawyers are employees even when they work in a law firm.
Thus building and keeping a clientele are crucial.
27See, for instance, the many studies on teachers finding that the distance between their place of birth and place of work is one of the main driving forces for teacher mobility. The literature on the labor mar ket of physicians also shows that personal determinants play a greater role than economical determinants in the location choices.
1I.R REVIEW birth more easily than can many of those in other similar occupations wit labor markets less dispersed geographically. To illustrate this, we used th Labor Force Survey to compute descriptive statistics on the percentage o workers who work in their birth departement,28 We restrict the comparison the persons born in metropolitan France who have a university degree. I 2004, this percentage was 45% for the lawyers but only 14% for the eng neers. This figure is particularly high, and we must bear in mind that it does not correct for the fact that the departement where the lawyer lived during his or her childhood may be different from the one where he was born.
In our empirical strategy, we include jurisdiction fixed effects. Thus w can estimate effects on the basis of changes in lawyer density within a jur diction. We benefit from large demographic changes during our period estimation. Between 1996 and 2003, the number of lawyers increased con tinuously, with an average growth rate of 3.7%: there were 60,000 lawyers in 1996 and 78,000 in 2003. This increase is explained largely by the glob increase in France of students attending universities during the 1990s, i particular of female students. As we said, a large percentage of these stu dents enroll in the bar close to their university. Thus the increase in th number of students, including students in law schools, entailed an increas of the number of lawyers in those regions where there is a law school. To see this, first note that there are only 12 law schools spread over the French t ritory (see Figure 4) . Then observe the strong overlap between these are where lawyers are trained and those that see the strongest increase in lawyer density over our time period (see Figure 5 ).
To sum up, changes in lawyer density are likely to be exogenous with respec to current labor market developments because lawyers' mobility is drive mostly by exogenous supply shocks due to demography and lawyers' locatio preferences, therefore making lawyer density a plausible instrument. Further supporting the identifying assumption that local labor market conditions a disconnected from the increase in lawyer density is the fact that lagged jo flows are found to have no predicting power on lawyer density when we inclu jurisdiction fixed effects and year dummies (see Appendix Table A .2). Table 2 presents the instrumental regressions (first stage) for each of o indicators of judicial activity on lawyer density, controls (year arid busine cycle indicators, appropriately transformed as will be described later), an jurisdiction fixed effects. Lawyer density positively affects filing and concili ation but negatively affects trials and workers' victory. Hence a larger supply of lawyers appears to favor the rule of law (more filings) and reinforce th negotiating role of lawyers over their lawsuit role. In the following, our p ferred specifications are the ones with the filing rate and the conciliati rate, since in both cases, the first stages display large F-tests (see Table 2 ). We examine now whether these estimates can be better un of our model. Consider lawyers and assume that an increa induces a decrease in the costs of litigation for the work decrease being larger for the cost at the trial stage than at th We assume that the impact on the costs of litigation for the f Under such assumptions, the model shows that Pw dec pw : more workers file a case since it is less costly, and more often at the conciliation stage than at the trial stage. F cost increases for the firms (see Figure 6 ). The filing rate number of dismissals is supposed to be constant. This is c results of the first stage in Table 2 : more lawyers imply a h As for the conciliation rate and the trial rate, the results of the model are ambiguous since the denominator is the number of filed cases, which increases. The results depend on the distribution of pw. If the distribution is uniform, we find the same results as those in Table 2 : a higher conciliation rate, a lower trial rate, and a lower worker winning rate since the new work ers who litigate have smaller probabilities of winning.
First Stage
29Another way of understanding this hypothesis would be to assume that workers are more cost sensi tive than firms. In any case, this hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the data. When we regress the fraction of firms represented by a lawyer on the lawyer density, it appears that the supply of lawyers has no significant effect on the firm lawyer rate. On the contrary, the fraction of workers represented by a lawyer is positively correlated with the lawyer density. Results are available from the authors. level. F is the F statistic of the joint significance of the variables. *Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Reduced-Form Regression
To check that our instrument is well correlated with job flows, we the reduced-form regression (see Table 3 ). Lawyer density has a str ative effect on job destructions, resulting in a clear positive eff employment growth since job creations are barely affected. Ha *Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
effect on job destructions comes from the extensive margin, meaning a smaller destruction rate of firms. Yet this last effect is less significant.
Main Empirical Results
Now we can turn to our main econometric model:
(1) Flowsj j + o.2BCjj-\ + \i Judicial Jndjt, + 8/ + y, + e/>r where Judiciallndj t is an indicator of judicial activity where the unit of obser vation is a Prud'hommes jurisdiction j for year t. BCjt is a business cycle indicator. Our labor market variables Flowsare the job flows at t jurisdiction level j at date t. <5 is a jurisdiction fixed effect; yt is the year in cator, and £jj is the residual. In each regression, observations are cluster at the local jurisdiction level. The jurisdiction areas display a large heter neity in size (measured by labor force or employment). We weight regressions by the 1999 labor force of the jurisdiction area. We cannot use a business indicator such as the local unemployment ra which is clearly too directly correlated to the job flows. Local unempl ment rate probably reflects unobserved economic shocks, which simult ously affect the quality of the cases brought to labor court, bias the judges their decisions, and affect the job flows. Thus we build an indicator of business cycle, which takes into account the initial differences across ju dictions and reflects the national business cycle. To do so, we instrum the measure of the local business cycle (number of unemployed regist at the local employment agency divided by the 1999 local labor force) the national unemployment rate (in the spirit of Bartik 1991 and Blanc and Katz 1992) using the following relation:
(2) Up,, = + y, + VLpUF*™" + rip., Then we use the predicted value 11 pJ of U pJ by (2) to compute our exo measure of cycle BC as where Up is the average of the predicted Up local unemployment rate UpJ . Table 4A presents estimates of Model (1) using OLS, without any control, except for jurisdiction fixed effects. Coefficients are often significant and close to 0.1-0.2. The filing rate and the conciliation rate are positively related to job destructions and negatively related to job creations and employment changes. The opposite is observed for the trial rate and the worker winning rate. Table 4B presents estimates of the same OLS equation with additional controls for the prevailing economic conditions: year fixed effects and busi ness cycle indicators. Most of the coefficients become non-significant; those that are significant have the opposite sign to that of Table 4A . Hence, OLS estimates are very sensitive to the business cycle, the major source of endo geneity, as advocated above.
To estimate the parameter /? measuring the causal impact of judicial activ ity on job flows, we adopt the instrumental approach described above and therefore project our judicial indicators on our instrument, business cycle indicators, year dummies, and local labor market fixed effects.
Our IV results are presented in Table 5 . The estimated coefficients are of the same sign as in our OLS specification with business cycle controls (Table  4B) . But now, most estimated coefficients are significant and of larger mag nitude. In particular, an increase in filing rates dampens employment fluc tuations, mostly in shrinking firms (job destructions), with a small positive *Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
aggregate effect. The effect on job destructions comes partly from the extensive margin, the coefficient being negative albeit marginally signifi cant. Moreover, a larger conciliation rate dampens job destructions when a ^Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
larger trial rate and a larger worker winning rate both increase job destruc tions. Hence, our IV results appear to better control for the endogeneity due to the business cycle with itsjoint effect on job flows and filing rates. All signs are consistent with our previous analysis based on the theoretical model. To sum up, a larger lawyer density encourages workers to file their cases, presumably because it is less costly for them to challenge their dis missals. Hence more workers go to court, with lower probabilities of win ning. Proportionally, more of them find an interest in ending the case at the conciliation stage rather than at the trial stage. Thus the conciliation rate increases, the trial rate decreases, and the worker winning rate decreases since those workers who go to the trial stage also have a lower probability of winning. All these judicial outcomes are accompanied by an increase in the firing costs for the firm. Table 5 shows that this increase is followed by a decrease in employment fluctuations, with a larger effect on shrinking firms. Thus there is a positive effect on employment growth. Yet this last result is less robust since the coefficient is less significant in the filing rate specification, which is our preferred IV specification.
The estimated effects are large. A one-standard-deviation increase in the conciliation rate or in the filing rate decreases the job destruction rate by 1.8 standard deviations: job destructions (i.e., the growth rate of employ ment losses) are decreased by seven percentage points in jurisdictions where the filing rate is one standard deviation larger. The effects on net employ ment growth are smaller: they stand between 0.6 and 1.1 standard devia tions (in absolute value) according to the filing rate and the conciliation rate specifications. Thus total employment growth rate is larger by four to seven percentage points in jurisdictions where the filing rate is one standard deviation larger.
Our results are difficult to compare with those contained in previous studies since most of them estimate EPL effects through changes in legisla tion. Our results showing that larger firing costs entail fewer employment fluctuations are consistent with Autor et al. (2007) and Kugler and Pica (2008) . Autor et al. (2007) also found a positive effect on employment growth. In their article they appeared skeptical about this result. Yet we bring another piece of evidence that firing costs could, in the short term, increase employment level. This is not contradictory with standard theoreti cal models that are ambiguous on employment effects, but it differs from most empirical studies in which the effects on aggregate employment stocks are either negative or insignificant. However, our analysis focuses on very short-term effects since our estimates are on employment growth with juris diction fixed effects. This could be an explanation for why our study differs from those that estimate long-term effects (as in cross-countries analyses).
That judicial activity has an immediate causal effect on job flows might seem surprising. First, similar regressions using lagged (one year) indicators of judicial outcomes give similar results. Second, even though the dynamics of our indicators are not easy to understand, it is important to remember that the outcomes of cases are measured in the year when the case ends.
Hence, most cases have started in the preceding year (or even earlier).
Firms therefore have a relatively clear view of the process as well as of the probability of winning their case, especially since (roughly) one-fourth of dismissals end in court; most employers have experienced at least one and often multiple trials. Abowd et al. (1999) showed that French establishments with 50 or more employees use entries more intensively than exits as the main tool for adjust ing employment. More precisely, they always hire at an increasing rate with employment growth (see Figure 1 in Abowd et al. 1999) . Simultaneously, separations are flat except for the very largest job destructions, when estab lishments drastically increase firings. Using such results, we may attempt to interpret our findings in terms of worker flows as long as most adjustments are relatively small and assuming that the way of using worker flows to adjust employment is more similar in small establishments than in establishments with 50 or more employees. Under these assumptions, since larger firing costs decrease employment growth, this decrease should come from fewer entries, this effect being larger in shrinking firms. Since we expect long term contracts to be partly replaced by short-term contracts, our results sug gest that when firms reduce total entries because of more costly court cases, they will mostly achieve this reduction by reducing entries under open ended contracts, even though entries under short-term contracts might still increase.
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Robustness Check
The effects of our judicial outcomes on job flows are large. In order their plausibility we provide one robustness assessment. This check a natural experiment run at the local level in the jurisdiction of Gr Grenoble is a city located at the foot of the French Alps in southe France. The jurisdiction of the labor court of Grenoble is the 15th l measured by its 1999 labor force (254, 567) . In 1996, in order to fa dispute resolution, the French Parliament passed a law empower judges to mandate a mediator. This law went unheeded, since labor were already supposed to invite the parties to stop the case bef thanks to the mandatory stage of conciliation. In 1995, Judge Blohorn-Brenneur was appointed President of the Social Divisio Court of appeals in Grenoble and decided to exploit the possibilities by this law in order to boost the conciliation process. Starting in 1 was done by 1) sending out an information letter and a questionnair parties in order to increase their awareness of mediation, 2) offerin tion and conflict management training to the judges of Grenoble, organizing specific hearings where mediation services were propose parties. 30 We will see that this experiment led to a strong increas conciliation rate from 1998 onwards in the Grenoble jurisdiction. to assess its impact on job flows, we run a simple difference-in-dif regression of the form:
(3) FlouiSp, = a!BCpt + a2-BCp+ ft x Grenoble x Postl998 + dfJ + y, + Spt where Grenoble is an indicator equal to one for the jurisdiction of ble interacted with an indicator equal to one during the treatmen (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . We present in Table 6A the estimates of Equation ( different control groups. First, we use all other French jurisdictions are presented in the first panel of Table 6A . Then, because some l cific shocks might put at risk the identifying assumption of this first ence-in-difference method, we consider the following control group jurisdictions of similar sizes (i.e., with a 1999 labor force between and 400,000) and 2) the jurisdictions surrounding the Grenoble tion (the other jurisdictions within Isere, the departement where G is located, and the jurisdictions belonging to departements contigu Isere). Results are presented in the second and third panels of Tab respectively. The last column of this table presents the estimated i the experiment on the conciliation rate (i.e., the estimates of /? a with Equation (3) where the conciliation rate is the endogenous va First, focusing on this last column and as claimed above, the Gr experiment substantially increased the conciliation rate by around percentage points-that is, about one standard deviation of the con ^Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. rate measured across years and jurisdictions. The difference is similar when Grenoble is compared with contiguous jurisdictions and jurisdictions of similar size. When we turn to the effect of the experiment on job flows, we see that a higher conciliation rate dampens job destructions; this result is similar to the one in our instrumental approach. Although obtained in slightly different time periods and with different identification strategies (interpretable as a local average treatment effect, as suggested by Imbens and Angrist 1994) , the two measures of the causal impact of the conciliation rate on job destructions have similar magnitudes.
To compare the magnitudes more precisely, we run an IV estimation using the difference-in-difference variable (i.e., Grenoble*Postl998 indica tor) as an instrument, as in Duflo (2001) . Results are given in Table 6B . We find coefficients on job destructions that are very similar to those in the IV specification using lawyer density. The results on job creations and employ ment growth are less coherent in the magnitudes of the estimates; neverthe less the signs are the same.
Conclusion
This article exploits judicial activity as a source of variation in dismissal costs In France, a large part of the firing cost comes from the compensator *Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. awards given to the workers through the judicial process: one dismissed per son in four challenges her dismissal in front of the labor court. Since local conditions of judicial activity vary, we use this source of variation to asses the effect of dismissal costs on the labor market. We analyze judicial activity using an original data set of individual labor disputes brought to court over the years 1996 to 2003. First, we present a simple theoretical framework helping us to relate litigation costs, judicial outcomes, and firing costs Indeed, the model shows that judicial outcomes are ambiguously related to dismissal costs. For instance, an increase in the firm litigation cost produce an increase in the firing cost and a decrease in the filing rate. By contrast workers faced with a negative shock on litigation costs are more likely to sue the firm; a larger filing rate is now associated with smaller firing costs.
Moreover, judicial outcomes are endogenous: economic conditions have an impact on the quality of the cases. For an instrumental approach, litig tion costs can be good instruments if their changes are not driven by local economic conditions. In this article, the instrumental variable is lawyer den sity, which is a proxy for judicial fees. Because lawyers tend to open their practice close to the university where they were, and because demographic led to a large increase in the number of lawyers during our period, change in their numbers should be unrelated to the number of cases in each labor court except through the litigation costs. Using the lawyer instrument, w show that judicial outcomes have a causal effect on job flows. Higher filing rates dampen employment fluctuations, yet with a larger effect in shrinking firms. This leads to a small positive effect on net employment growth. Yet this last result is less robust to different specifications.
These results can be interpreted through the eyes of our model: in the jurisdictions where the number of lawyers increases, legal fees are reduced and so are the litigation costs for the workers. They litigate more often, but "bad" cases end more often at the conciliation stage. As a result, the firing costs increase for the firms. Then our empirical analysis shows that facing these higher firing costs, firms decrease job flows but adjust more on the destruction than on the creation margin. Finally, a decrease in litigation costs for the workers seems to stimulate employment growth.
These results on employment fluctuations confirm previous studies that also use job flows (Autor et al. 2007; Kugler and Pica 2008) . The novelty is this new source of variation of dismissal costs, which allows us to identify the effects without being dependent on new legislation. The novelty is also in the magnitude of the effects. It means that the differences in the judicial environment within a country in which the labor laws are the same can cre ate large differences in the local labor market. Therefore, the enforcement of labor laws should be taken into account when we compare the impact of regulation across countries and populations. Yet we also show that interpret ing judicial outcomes in terms of firing costs is not straightforward: in our analysis, a higher firing cost is associated with a higher conciliation rate and a lower trial rate. On the contrary, litigation costs have more direct interpre tations and could be more often used to compare the level of EPL enforce ment across countries. We assume that the compensatory awar firm is certain to lose at trial, it is less cos payment. That is:
CM < cm + F + h anc* lhus p* < 1.
In addition, the firm accepts the concil going to trial, that is:
Pw^Ctn T /^vv)Cm + It > C\ ^ /, which means: * Cc " Cm It + lc PW > Pn = -F In order for a conciliation to exist, suing must be a credible threat to the employer. Therefore, we impose that p*w < pv , that is cc -cm +lc <kt +U . In addition, there must be a probability range in which the worker is better off conciliating than going to trial. We must have , that is cm <cc-kc.
Finally, for the trial stage to exist, the firm must be better off in some probability range going to trial rather than giving the compensatory award cM that protects against any suing: pw < p".
To summarize, we have five assumptions: Assumptions Condition (1):k, > cc -cm+lc-lt: the cost of trial is sufficiently large (p k < p,<). Condition (2):cc -kc > cm: the gain for the worker at the conciliation stage is larger than the severance payment he or she receives in case of firing for a personal reason (j\, < ).
Condition (3):cc+lc <cm '■ the cost for the firm at the conciliation stage is smaller than the severance payment received by the worker in case of fir ing for an economic reason.
Conditions (1), (2), and (3) taken together allow for the possibility of a con ciliation stage.
Condition (4): The compensatory award Fis large enough that when the firm is certain to lose at trial, it is less costly to pa^ the maximum severance pay ment. That is: cm < cm +F + 1, . It implies P* <1 and excludes an equilib rium in which the law has no deterrent effect, every worker being fired for a personal reason. Condition (5): cc -kc +kt +lt <cu'-there is a probability range for a trial to exist. The firm is better off at trial than paying cM. If the litigation cost for the worker k, increases, the total firing cost for the firm decreases. The numbers of filed cases and trials decrease. Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses. Each regression includes jurisdiction and year fixed effects. 1999 labor force of the jurisdictions is used as weights. Clusters: jurisdiction level. ^Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
